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ARGUMENT 
1. By not requiring compliance with Judicial Rules of Practice & Procedure Rule 18 
C (c) the Industrial Commission exceeded its power and authority. 
The Industrial Commission as "an administrative agency is a creature of statute, limited 
to the power and authority granted to it by the Legislature and may not exercise its sub-
legislative powers to modify, alter, or enlarge the legislative act which it administers." Simpson 
v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 134 Idaho 209, 112, 998 P.2d 1122, 1126 (2000). The Commission 
may only exercise that discretion granted by the Legislature. The Legislature's use of the word 
"shall" denotes a mandatory, not a discretionary, act. Id. at 134 Idaho 112, 134 P.2d at 1125. 
Idaho Code § 72-508 precisely sets forth the authority, and limitations, of the Industrial 
Commission. In relevant part it provides: 
" ... the commission shall have authority to promulgate and adopt reasonable rules 
and regulations for effecting the purpose of this act ... the commission shall have 
authority to promulgate and adopt reasonable rules and regulations involving 
judicial matters ... Rules and regulations as promulgated and adopted, ifnot 
inconsistent with the law, shall be binding in the administration of this law." 
Pursuant to its rule-making authority the Commission adopted its Judicial Rules & 
Procedures (JRP&P). In doing so it is bound to follow its JRP&P. By adopting JRP&P Rule 18 
the Commission is bound to strictly adhere to its requirements when considering lump sum 
settlement agreements. The plain language of JRP&P Rule 18 C (c) requires: 
C. "Text of the terms of settlement ... shall include: ... 
c. Claimant's current medical and employment status." (Appendix A). 
Workers compensation benefits can only be awarded as provided under the statutes and 
the Commission's rules. See Sadiku v. AAtronics Incorporated, 142 Idaho 410, 411, 128 P.3d 
947,948, (2006). The Industrial Commission has no discretion to proceed to approve a proposed 
settlement that does not comply with the mandatory requirements of JRP&P Rule 18 C (c). See 
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Henry v. Ysursa, 148 Idaho 913, 916, 231 P.3d 1010, 1013 (2008). Unless the Commission 
finds that all of the requisite textual elements of a lump sum settlement agreement exist, it may 
not approve the agreement. It is the duty of the Commission to make a full and exhaustive 
inquiry when counsel overlook an important and material matter. Piersdorff v. Gray's Auto 
Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 450, 74 P.2d 171 (1937). It is error for the Commission to approve an 
agreement that clearly fails to contain all of the requisite elements. See Wernecke v. St. Maries 
Joint School District #401, 147 Idaho 277, 286, 207 P.3d 1008, 1017 (2009). 
The Industrial Commission tacitly acknowledged that the proposed settlement did not 
comply with Rule 18 C (c), because its text did not set forth Morris's current medical and 
employment status. Nonetheless the Commission asserted that its proceeding to approve the 
proposed settlement, without the mandatory requirements, was not a "critical flaw." R. p. 386. 
The Commission asserted that its failure to comply with statutory and rule mandatory 
requirements was excused because its 'benefits file' contained "medical reports" and 
"rehabilitation reports" and that it was "well aware that Claimant suffered a head injury." R. p. 
386. The knowledge that Morris suffered a head injury does not meet the plainly stated 
requirement that the text of a proposed settlement agreement "shall" state a claimant's current 
medical and employment status. 
The Commission asserted that the purpose of Rule 18 is to "ensure the Commission has 
information on which a determination can be made." R. P. 386. While one purpose of the 
mandatory requirements is to provide the Commission with information, it is submitted that 
another, equally important, purpose is that the injured worker needs to be informed of what the 
Commission is being told about his or her current medical and employment status when it 
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considers whether or not the proposed settlement is in his or her best interest. In his December 
28,2009, letter to the Commission, Morris's attorney represented: 
"The Claimant has been released to return to work without significant physical 
work restrictions. He is exploring vocational options and anticipates utilizing 
proceeds from the LSS resolution to assist with retraining costs." R. p. 280. 
Morris's medical records, and the report of the vocational expert hired to assist the 
attorney, are dramatically irreconcilable with his attorney's representations to the Commission. 
Morris's treating physician'S medical records, prior to his attorney's letter to the 
Commission, that: 
1. August 2, 2009, his treating physician, Dr. Stanek-He is still not back to work. He 
needs Botulinum Toxin to reduce neck and shoulder spasms, to have his vision 
checked, psychological counseling to address his chronic pain issues, depression, 
anxiety, and anger, and vocational rehabilitation. R. p. 375-376. 
2. November 13, 2009, his treating physician, Dr. Stanek-He needs to stay with his 
family and be observed over the next three days. He is not to drive for the next three 
days. He is to follow-up for repeat Botulinum Toxin injections on the 1 ih. R. p. 377. 
3. November 14, 2009, his treating physician, Dr. Stanek-Wrote to Morris's attorney 
that "The simple fact remains that Ben is still not back to work. My intention was for 
Ben to be involved in a multidisciplinary program to address his headaches, neck 
pain, TMJ, de conditioning, assistance with diabetic management, psychological 
issues including the anger he is experiencing, and nutrition/weight loss ... At this point 
I think that it would be in Ben's best interest to move forward. Ben should work 
closely with a vocational rehabilitation counselor to determine suitable work 
situations." R. p. 105. 
4. November 25, 2009, his treating physician, Dr. Stanek-He has unresolved TMJ; 
post concussive syndrome; depression with anxiety; diabetes; chronic neck pain and 
spasms; chronic headaches; nightmares; and dizziness. He is to be continued on 
Lexapro and Prevacid and to follow up in one month. R. p. 378. 
The vocational expert's report is dated December 15,2009. R. pp. 200-203. It 
documented that Morris: 
1. Has an ongoing traumatic brain injury with no resolve to the claimant's need for 
psychological and vocational assistance. 
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2. Has been found eligible for Social Security Disability benefits. (See also award, R. p. 
69) 
3. Is eligible for rehabilitation services from the Idaho Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation. 
4. Cannot return to his time of injury employment nor can he return to employment 
within his previous heavy-duty employment. 
5. Requires a non-stressful sheltered work environment. 
6. Needs a sheltered employment placement with ajob coach. 
7. Needs a work hardening program. 
Morris's medical records subsequent to the attorney's letter, and before the Commission 
approved the LSSA, are consistent with the previous records. On January 15, 2010, his treating 
physician, Dr. Stanek, referred Morris to the SLRI Pain Clinic for a comprehensive program to 
facilitate helping him return to work. R. p. 236. 
Without the mandatory current medical and employment status information being set 
forth in the text of the proposed settlement, the Commission did not have the required current 
medical and employment information. The Commission was not compelled by any statutory or 
rule imposed time constraint to approve the LSSA without the required current information. The 
Commission had no discretion to disregard the required compliance with JRP&P Rule 18 C (c).! 
Piersdorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 450, 74 P.2d 171 (1937). In absence of full 
compliance with Rule 18 C ( c), the Commission lacked the authority to approve the proposed 
settlement agreement. The Commission's order is void. See Wernecke at 147 Idaho 286, 207 
P.3d at 1017. 
1 As noted in the Opening Brief, the Commission refused to provide a copy of the "synopsis of the 
case" prepared for it by a 'Benefits Analyst' at the Commission asserting that it represented 
"privileged work product." . AR, p. 10. However, a portion of the Benefits Analyst's review process 
is contained in record provided by the Commission at R. pp. 306-307. It appears from these e-mail 
communications with Liberty that the only review undertaken by the Analyst occurred on January 
13th to 14th, 2010, to verify the correct amount of temporary total disability benefits that had been 
previously paid to Morris. His review revealed that Liberty overpaid this benefit, for the period of 1-
8-08 to 12-1-08, in the sum of$416.06, and Liberty waived the 'overpayment'. 
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ARGUMENT 
2. The representations of Appellant Morris's attorney to the Industrial Commission 
constitute the degree of fraud necessary to set aside the Commission's approval 
of the LSSA. 
Idaho Code § 72-718 provides: 
"A decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive 
To all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the decision ... " 
The Commission, citing the Court's decision in Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co., Inc., 112 
Idaho 291, 732 P.2d 260 (1986), held that only allegations and proof of fraud on the part of 
employer's surety in procuring the agreement is sufficient and thus "there is no evidence before 
us on which we could legitimately rely to support a finding of fraud." R. p. 387 (emphasis in 
Commission's decision); p. 287. 
It is submitted that the Harmon decision is limited to its facts wherein fraud was alleged 
based upon allegations that the surety's adjuster mislead the claimant. The adoption of such a 
narrow limitation of fraud is unwarranted. The Commission has previously recognized and held 
that if the intent of the legislature was to narrowly define words in a statute it will do so within 
the plain language ofthe statute. See The Industrial Commission v. Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., 
I.C. 2007-028248, pp. 18-26 (January 13, 2012). Appendix B. In Oasis, the Commission 
addressed the question of whether or not the statutory prohibition of an assignment of a claim for 
compensation set forth in Idaho Code § 72-802 also applied to an 'assignment of compensation.' 
The Commission, in a decision that it acknowledged had the effect of eliminating perhaps the 
only means by which an injured worker "would be able to keep a roof over his head, or put food 
on the table" during protracted workers' compensation proceedings, held that Idaho Code § 72-
802 should not be narrowly limited. It stated: 
"had it been the intent of the legislature to narrowly define the word 'claim' to 
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only mean the assignment of claimant's chose in action, not to include the 
proceeds payable as a consequence of the successful prosecution of that claim, 
then the amendment would have been stated differently, or incorporated elsewhere 
in the statute." Id. p. 23. 
Likewise, had the legislature intended to limit "fraud" to actions perpetrated by the 
surety, it would have done so with plain wording so stating. 
The Commission's proceedings are governed by its own set of procedures regarding 
pleadings and it is not bound to follow the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However the 
Commission, as support for its narrow interpretation of "fraud" limiting it to conduct by the 
surety, cited LR.C.P. Rule 60 (b) (3), which provides for relief from a judgment for fraud of an 
adverse party. R. p. 388. Rule 60 (b) (3) is not applicable to an interpretation of the Workers' 
Compensation Act, especially where the plain wording of the statute enacted by the legislature 
contains no such limitation. 
The Court has consistently held that the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally 
construed in favor of the employee in order to serve the humane purpose for which it was 
promulgated. Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District #401, 147 Idaho 277, 282, 207 P.3d 
1008, 1013 (2009). Construing the phrase "in the absence of fraud" to only mean fraud on the 
perpetrated by the surety does not serve the purpose of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act to 
keep an injured worker and the worker's family from becoming destitute because the 
breadwinner has been injured and cannot work. Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 51, 260 
P.3d 1186, 1193 (2011). In order to serve the humane purpose of the Act, it does not matter 
from where the fraud emanated. If limiting the construction of "in the absence of fraud" was the 
intent of the legislature, it would have so stated in the statute. 
Undersigned counsel has not located an opinion of this Court addressing the nature of the 
conduct necessary to establish the nature of fraud by a client's counsel that is sufficient to hold 
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that a judgment or settlement contract voidable. Research into the decisions of other jurisdictions 
revealed that conduct "where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's 
interest to the other side" is conduct sufficiently fraudulent to set aside a judgment. See United 
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 66, 25 L.Ed 93 (1878); Alexander v. Alexander, 229 S.W.2d 
234,236-239, (Ark. 1950). These decisions discuss that, in cases where an attorney sells out his 
client's interests and there has not been "a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case," such 
conduct is sufficient to "annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and 
fair hearing." United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 66; Alexander v. Alexander, 229 
S.W.2d at 236. 
Counsel has not been able to locate any elaboration on what constitutes conduct 
consisting of corruptly selling out his client's interests to the other side. Corruption is defined in 
Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Edition, as being the act of a fiduciary who wrongfully uses 
his station to procure some benefit for himself contrary to his duty and the rights of others. See 
Appendix C. The facts in the record support a fmding that this occurred in this matter. 
Prior to sending his letter in support of his attorney fees to the Commission, Morris's 
attorney was aware that Morris had qualified for Social Security Disability Benefits. R. p. 240. 
U.S. Social Security Administration's requirements for a person to receive Disability Benefits 
are strict. 
"Social Security pays benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical 
condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death ... While some 
programs give money to people with partial disability or short-term disability, 
Social Security does not." (Appendix D). 
Contrary to the attorney's representations to the Commission that Morris was recovered 
to the extent that he was able to return to work, Morris's counsel was aware that Morris was 
receiving Social Security Disability Benefits and that he was receiving them because he was not 
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able to work. The attorney's affidavit, filed in support of his objection to Morris's attempt to 
have the LSSA set aside, stated that in drafting the LSSA's language he had language inserted to 
protect the Disability Benefits that Morris was receiving from SoCial Security. He stated: 
"To help protect against the social security offset, I asked Liberty to include the language 
in the agreement averaging Claimant's recovery over his lifespan." R. p. 172, ~ 17. 
The LSSA did not inform the Commission, and the Commission did not ask, why the 
lump sum was apportioned to represent weekly prorated payments. If the Claimant was able to to 
return to work as he represented to the Commission the obvious question would be, "Why is that 
necessary?" The attorney's letter to the Commission also did not provide any explanation for the 
lump sum being prorated and representing weekly payments of $15.73. Neither the LSSA, or the 
attorney's representations to the Commission, made any mention of the fact that the Social 
Security Administration had determined, just two months earlier, that Morris was incapable of 
working and therefore entitled to Disability Benefits. Indeed, such a representation would have 
been totally inconsistent with the attorney's affirmative representation to the Commission that 
Morris could return to work without significant physical restrictions. 
In the attorney's argument against Morris's request that the Commission set aside the 
LSSA, he offered no explanation, and the Commission did not require him to provide any 
explanation, for the inconsistency between his representation that Morris was physically able to 
return to work and the fact that he was receiving Social Security Disability benefits because he 
could not work, in need of treatment at a pain clinic to facilitate his return to work, and in need 
of a sheltered workplace with a job coach. In the memorandum in support of the motion to set 
aside the LSSA Morris argued to the Commission that, at best, this could only be viewed as 
constructive fraud on the claimant and the Commission. R. p. 369. 
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Constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of 
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence resulting in damage to another. Constructive fraud 
usually arises from a breach of duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists. Bethalamy v. 
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 62-62, 415 P. 2d 698, 705-706, (1966). Morris and his attorney's 
relationship was a fiduciary one. Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 P.2d 707, 714 
(Idaho App. 1991). When there is a duty to speak because of a fiduciary relationship, a failure to 
do so is a specie of fraud for which relief may be afforded. McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 
353 P.2d 760 (1960); See Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 820 P.2d 707 (Idaho App. 
1991). Morris's attorney had the duty to inform him that not only did he not include the required 
textual information regarding his current medical and employment status in the LSSA, but also 
the duty to inform him that he was going to represent to the Commission that he was recovered 
to the extent that he was able to return to work. The attorney did not inform Morris that he had to 
make such a representation and that, without such a representation the Commission would in all 
likelihood not approve such a settlement and his attorney fees. The attorney did not advise 
Morris that, without such a representation, the Commission would be compelled to conduct an 
inquiry into the merits of his claim in order to "properly judge whether an injured worker is 
surrendering a strong claim for too small a settlement." Wernecke v. st. Maries Joint School 
District #401, supra., quoting Commissioner Maynard, at note 9. 
The LSSA, and the attorneys letter in support of his attorney fees, represented to the 
Commission that Morris's attorney would receive fees and costs of $15,023.00 to be deducted 
from the settlement proceeds. R. p. 280. They also represent that Morris would receive the net 
sum of $31,623.03. Morris did not receive that sum. Morris's attorney deducted $1,000.00 from 
the 'net sum' as reimbursement for an advance that he made to Morris, before the LSSA and the 
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attorney's letter were submitted, on December 21, 2009. The Commission was not informed 
about it. R. p. 119. Morris's attorney also deducted another $2,000.00 from the 'net sum', after 
the LSSA and attorney's letter were submitted, as reimbursement for a second advance that he 
made to Morris on January 14, 2010. R. p. 120. The actual net sum that Morris received from 
the settlement proceeds was $27,453.53. The relevant point is not that the attorney advanced 
Morris money. Morris no doubt needed it to pay for basic living expenses and to get his car 
repaired. R. p. 175. It is respectfully submitted that the relevant point is that Morris's attorney 
had requested Liberty to "expedite preparation of the LSS documentation," because Morris was 
"in need of these settlement funds as soon as possible," and in less than one month's time, he 
needed $3,000.00 to live on. R. p. 117. 
Under the Commission's Workers' Compensation Benefits Table, if he was totally and 
permanently disabled, Morris would be entitled to receive a minimum of $289.35 per 
week/$1,157.40 per month. See Appendix E. The 'net sum' Morris would receive under the 
LSSA was roughly the equivalent of two (2) years workers' compensation benefits despite the 
fact that he was by all contemporaneous indications, in the medical records, in the vocational 
expert's report, and in Social Security Administration's determination, unable to work at all. At 
the time that the settlement was approved Morris was thirty-three (33) years old and had a 
reasonable life expectancy under Social Security Administration's Actuarial Life Table of forty-
four (44) years. See Appendix F. If Morris was found to be totally and permanently disabled, he 
would be entitled to receive an $1,157.40 per month for his lifetime and that monthly amount 
would increase on a yearly basis depending upon the state average weekly wage. 
It is the Commission's responsibility to ensure that a proposed settlement is in the best 
interest of the injured worker. Idaho Code § 72-404. "This is a responsibility that the 
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Commission must scrupulously honor." Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. #401, 147 Idaho 
277, 286, 207 P .3d 1008, 1017 (2009). While the Commission had general knowledge that 
Morris suffered a "head injury" and that ''the LSSA left medical benefits open" it did not have 
the necessary, and required, information regarding his current medical and employment status. 
Without this information the Commission did not have sufficient information to consider the 
LSSA. R. p. 386. If the Commission had been provided, and required that it be provided the 
mandatory information in the text of the proposed settlement agreement, it would have realized 
that Morris was not able to return to work, that he needed treatment at a pain clinic to facilitate 
his possible return to work, and that he needed two advances from his attorney to live on within 
the one month period of time immediately prior to its consideration of the LSSA, the 
Commission, in exercising its responsibility to scrupulously ensure that the settlement was in 
Morris's best interest, would have had to reject the notion that the $15.73 per week/$62.92 per 
month allocation, of the one lump sum he would receive, would be sufficient to keep Morris and 
his family from becoming destitute. 
It is respectfully submitted that the attorney's action in affirmatively misrepresenting that 
Morris was physically able to return to work, when he did not include such a representation in 
the terms of the LSSA or provide Morris with a copy of, or inform Morris of, his representations 
to the Commission, constitutes the degree of corrupt selling out of his client's interest sufficient 
to hold the Commission's approval ofthe LSSA is void. 
ARGUMENT 
3. The Commission erred in failing to provide Morris a hearing on the issue of fraud. 
The Commission held that "there is no evidence before us on which we could 
legitimately rely to support a finding of fraud" because it erred in limiting "fraud" to acts 
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perpetrated by the surety and as a result it sub silentio denied Morris's request for a hearing on 
the issue. R. p. 287. The Commission's pleading procedures are set forth in Rule 3 of the Judicial 
Rules of Practice & Procedure. Appendix G. They are similar to other administrative agency 
rules in that regard. Rule 3 does not require fraud to be pled with particularity. The 
Commission's rules do not establish any standard necessary to be set forth, by affidavit or 
testimony, to assert a claim of fraud for the purpose of obtaining a full hearing. See Staff of the 
Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 635, 22 P.3d 105, 110. (2001). In 
the two reported decisions where this Court had occasion to address appeals from the 
Commission that involved allegations of fraud the decisions reflect that the Commission held a 
hearing to fully vet the fraud allegations. See Harmon v. Lutes Construction Company, Inc., 112 
Idaho 291, 732 P. 2d 260 (1986); Sadiku v. AAtronics Incorporated, 142 Idaho 410, 128 P.3d 
947 (2006). 
At hearing Morris would have the burden of proving all the elements of constructive 
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Harmon v. Lute's Construction Company, Inc., 112 
Idaho 291, 293, 732 P.2d 260, 263 (1986). However, at the motion stage seeking to obtain a 
hearing, Morris was not required to prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Staff 
of the Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Norling, 135 Idaho 630, 635, 22 P.3d 105, 110 (2001). 
The Commission further attempted to support its denial of a hearing by stating that 
Morris "is free to seek recourse as it may be available to him in some other venue [civil suit], but 
the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction to address those issues." R. p. 388. The 
Commission's refusal to provide a timely hearing and requiring him to pursue his remedy 
through civil litigation is contrary the legislative intent that the workers' compensation law 
provide sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families. Idaho State Insurance Fund 
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v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 911, 980 P.2d 566, 574 (1999). Morris is not seeking damages 
against his attorney in this proceeding. If, after a hearing, the Commission determines that 
Morris has presented clear and convincing evidence that the attorney's actions constitute 
constructive fraud, he will not have suffered substantial damage that would require him to 
consider proceeding through a complicated, expensive, and time consuming a civil lawsuit. The 
legislature intended that the workers' compensation act "give injured workmen a speedy, 
summary, and simple remedy for the recovery of compensation in all cases coming within its 
provisions." Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 450, 74 P.2d 171 (1937). Morris is 
asking the Commission to review and clarify his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act 
and it is in his best interest that he not be sUbjected to civil litigation to resolve his workers' 
compensation rights. See Williams v. Blue Cross ofIdaho, 151 Idaho 51, 54, 55, 260 P.3d 1186, 
1189, 1191 (2011). The legislature intended that the workers' compensation act "give injured 
workmen a speedy, summary, and simple remedy for the recovery of compensation in all cases 
coming within its provisions." Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 450, 74 P.2d 171 
(1937). The Commission's determination, requiring Morris to pursue a civil suit to seek redress, 
in a matter that is fully capable of being resolved through the Commission's hearing process, 
does not conform with the legislature's intent that an injured worker's remedy be speedy, 
summary in nature, and simple. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Industrial Commission should be held void and this matter 
remanded to the Industrial Commission due to the Commission's failure to comply with JRP&P 
Rule 18 C (c). In the alternative, the judgment of the Industrial Commission should be held void 
and this matter remanded for a hearing on the issue of fraud. 
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Respectfully submitted this 7th day of November, 2012. 
~U£bC 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Appellant Morris 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief were mailed on the i h day of 
November, 2012, by regular U.S. Mail with postage prepaid thereon, to the attorney for 
Respondent as follows: 
Kent W. Day 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 6358 







LUMW SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
A. Service, Form. 
Documents necessary to finalize settlement under this rule shall be filed and a copy 
served on the other parties. The text of a settlement agreement shall be on 8.5" X 11" paper and 
shall identity the attorney or party that prepared it. 
B. Standard of Review. 
Prior to approving a lump sum settlement, the Commission will review a proposed lump 
sum settlement to determine whether such settlement is in the best interests of all parties. 
Supporting documents shall be complete, accurate, legible, and arranged in chronological order 
with the earliest date proceeding to the most recent date without duplicate submissions. 
C. Requirements. 
To ensure the Commission has information on which a determination can be made, the 
Commission requires the parties to submit the following information and serve a copy on each of 
the parties: 
1. Text of the terms of settlement, which shall include: 
a. The parties' names, 
b. Industrial Commission claim number(s), 
c. Claimant's current medical and employment status, 
d. A list of all medical providers paid, grouped within categories which are 
"physician," "hospital," "therapy," "mileage," "miscellaneous," 
e. An itemized summary of benefits paid and those to be paid, 
f. Outstanding and unpaid medical expenses, if any, 
g. Method of calculating benefits and supporting data, including key medical 
records, 
h. Signature of the claimant and the signatures of all other parties, or the 
authorized agents of the other parties, to the agreement, 
Judicial Rules 
i. An itemization of any and all fees and costs charged by claimant's counsel 
prior to the submission of the agreement and an itemization of fees and 
costs to be deducted from the lump sum payment or payments, and 
j. A copy of the attorney fee agreement between claimant and counsel for 
claimant. 
2. Attorney fee letters as set forth in IDAPA 17.02.05.281. 
3. An affirmative statement that the agreement is in the best interests of the parties, 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-404. 
D. Effect of Submissiou and Hearings. 
The submission of a proposed lump sum settlement or agreement shall not be considered 
a motion. If the Commission declines to approve a proposed lump sum settlement agreement, 
the Commission may request additional relevant information, or on its own motion or on the 
motion of a party to the agreement schedule a hearing limited to the issue of whether the lump 
sum settlement and discharge of one or more defendants is for the best interest of all parties. 
There is no appeal from the Commission's decision. 
E. Format. 
The information required under Section C of this rule shall be submitted in a format 
substantially similar to the form provided in Appendix 6A and B. 
COMMENT: Paragraph D reflects the administrative process in reviewing proposed lump sum 
settlement agreements. If not initially approved, the parties may still submit additional iriformation for 
consideration by the Commission. Also, an administrative hearing is available to the parties for 
presentation of relevant information for the Commission to consider in reviewing the lump sum settlement 
proposal. 
Judicial Rules 28 . 
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By Order dated January 26,2011, Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., ("Oasis") was ordered to 
show cause why certain legal funding contracts between Oasis, and two Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Claimants, Bret Tylinski and Jonathan Gould, should not be found to be invalid 
under the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws. Subsequent thereto, the Commission was 
presented with a proposed lump sum settlement in the case of Terry Denny v. URS, for review 
and approval. That agreement anticipated a payment from the proceeds of the lump sum 
settlement to Oasis, in satisfaction of another legal funding contract. The Industrial Commission 
consolidated the three matters for the purposes of a show cause proceeding held on November 3, 
2011 at Boise, Idaho. Present for Oasis was R. Daniel Bowen, Esq., of Boise, Idaho, and 
William M. McErlean, Esq., of Chicago, Illinois. At hearing, the testimony of Lisa Foreman, 
General Counsel for Oasis, was taken. Oasis offered Exhibits 1 -- 15, which were admitted into 
evidence. The prehearing deposition of James Arnold was also admitted into evidence. In 
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addition to the foregoing, the Commission takes judicial notice of its own legal files on each of 
the three matters consolidated for purposes ofthe show cause proceeding. 
Oasis submitted a post-hearing brief and the matter came under advisement on December 
5,2011. Being fully apprised in the law and the premises, the Commission issues the following 
decision regarding the applicability of the provisions of I.C. § 72-802 to the Oasis purchase 
agreements. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Gould v. Ormond Builders, Inc. 
1. Jonathan Gould suffered a work related injury on or about May 22, 2008. His 
timely claim was accepted by Surety, and workers' compensation benefits were paid to 
Claimant, or on his behalf, for the effects of the injury. The parties disputed the extent and 
degree of both Claimant's impairment and disability in excess of impairment. These and other 
disputes were resolve~ via a lump sum settlement approved by the Industrial Commission on or 
about September 2, 2010. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, it was anticipated that 
Claimant would receive $32,391.50 lump sum consideration. The Commission approved 
attorney's fees in amount of $8,097.88, and costs in the amount of$l,OOO.OO. Per the terms of 
the agreement, it was anticipated that Claimant would net $23,293.62 after the payment of 
attorney's fees and costs. On or about September 9, 20 I 0, the Industrial Commission was 
contacted by Claimant who had questions about additional funds withheld from the settlement. 
An inquiry from the Industrial Commission revealed that following approval of the lump sum 
settlement agreement, Surety contacted the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to ascertain 
whether or not a child support withholding order was in effect. Upon being advised of the 
settlement, the Department of Health and Welfare immediately issued a withholding order and 
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delivered the same to Surety. Surety deducted the sum of $11,646.81 from the settlement 
amount for payment to the Department of Health and Welfare in satisfaction of the withholding 
order. Surety then forwarded a check in the amount of $20,744.69, ($32,391.50 - $11,646.81) to 
Claimant's counsel. 
2. The Commission also learned that an additional payment had been made directly 
from counsel's client trust account to an entity identified as Oasis Legal Finance, L.L.C., in the 
amount of $7,461.00. Claimant's counsel explained that this payment was made to satisfy 
Claimant's obligation under the terms of an agreement he had previously made with Oasis. After 
deductions for costs and attorney's fees approved by the Commission, the valid child support 
order, and the payment to Oasis, Claimant netted $4,185.81 from the original settlement of 
$32,391.50. 
3. At the request of the Commission, counsel provided the Commission with a copy 
oran Oasis "Purchase Agreement" executed by Claimant on June 16,2009, pursuant to the terms 
of which he received the immediate payment of $3,650.00. The agreement describes the 
transaction as follows: 
Seller [Gould] sells all of Seller's interest in and to the Purchased Interest to 
Purchaser [Oasis], and Purchaser purchases the Purchased Interest from Seller on 
the terms and conditions provided in this Purchase Agreement. The purchase of 
the Purchased Interest shall entitle Purchaser to receive the Oasis Ownership 
Amount ... As consideration for the sale of the Purchased Interest, Purchasers 
shall pay the Purchase Price to Seller ... " 
Oasis Ex. 8, p. 55. 
4. The terms "Purchased Interest" and "Oasis Ownership Amount," are defined as 
follows: 
"Oasis Ownership Amount" is the amount Purchaser is to be paid out of the 
Proceeds and as detennilwd ~s of the date Purchaser receives payment based on 
the Payment Schedule on Page 1 of this Purchase Agreement. 
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"Purchased Interest" means the right to receive a portion of the Proceeds equal to 
the Oasis Ownership Amount on the further terms and conditions provided for in 
this Purchase Agreement. 
§§ 1.2 and 1.4, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 56. 
Therefore, the interest that Oasis purchased for the sum of $3,650.00 is its right to 
recover from the proceeds of the workers' compensation case the "Oasis Ownership Amount," 
an amount which equals the original purchase price plus an additional amount that increases with 
the passage of time. Per the Gould agreement, the Oasis ownership amount payable to Oasis at 
any particular time is described in the payment schedule: 
Oasis Ownership Amount 
Payment Schedule 
June 16,2009 to December 15,2009 
December 16, 2009 to June 15,2010 
June 16,2010 to September 15, 2010 
September 16, 2010 to December 15, 
2010 
Oasis Ownership Amount: (payoff Amount) 
$5,475.00 
December 16, 2010 to June 15,2011 
June 16,2011 to December 15,2011 
December 16,2011 and thereafter 
Fees Due at Repayment: 







Subsequent Case Review for each additional funding 
Facsimile and Photocopying Costs per Funding 




5. The purchase agreement further specifies that the Oasis ownership amount shall 
be determined as of the date Oasis receives payment in full from or on behalf of seller. 
Importantly, the agreement specifies that seller is not entitled to receive any proceeds from the 
workers' compensation claimant until Oasis has received the Oasis ownership amount. (See, 
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Oasis Ex. 8, p. 58). To this end, Oasis required both Gould, and his attorney, to execute an 
"irrevocable letter of direction" contemporaneous with the execution of the purchase agreement. 
Pursuant to the terms of irrevocable letter of direction, both Claimant and his attorney 
acknowledge and agree that the Oasis ownership amount is to be paid from the proceeds of any 
settlement of the workers' compensation claim before any funds are released to Claimant. The 
letter further anticipates that any settlement monies paid by Employer/Surety will be paid by 
check to Claimant's attorney, and that all disbursements of funds will be made through the 
attorney's client trust account. (See, Oasis Ex. 10, p. 64). 
6. The purchase agreement also makes it clear that in the event Gould takes nothing 
on his underlying worker's compensation claim, he has no obligation to pay the Oasis ownership 
amount. 
7. Notwithstanding that the payment schedule for the Oasis ownership amount bears 
some similarities to the repayment of the principal amount of a loan, plus interest thereon, the 
agreement goes to some length to dispel any notion that the transaction should be construed as a 
loan versus a purchase and sale: 
Risk of Loss; No Loan Transaction. The purchase of the Purchased Interest and 
the other transactions contemplated by this Purchase Agreement involve a 
substantial economic risk and a bona fide risk of loss to Purchaser. The Oasis 
Ownership Amount has been negotiated to account for such risk. The sale of the 
Purchased Interest is an . absolute sale and not a loan secured by a collateral 
assignment ofthe Purchased Interest. 
Treatment of Transaction. Seller agrees to treat and report this sale and purchase 
of the Purchased Interest as a sale transaction and not as a loan for all purposes 
(including tax purposes). 
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Treatment in Bankruptcy. If Seller commences or has commenced against it any 
case or other proceeding pursuant to any bankruptcy, insolvency or similar law 
prior to payment of the full Oasis Ownership Amount to Purchaser, Seller shall 
cause the Purchased Interest to be described as an asset of Purchaser (and not as a 
debt obligation of Seller) in any oral or written communications, including, 
without limitation, any schedule or other document filed in connection with such 
case or proceeding. 
§§ 3.1, 5.1, 5.2, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 57. 
8. As of the date of settlement of the underlying workers' compensation claim, the 
payment schedule specifies that Oasis was entitled to collect the sum of $8,212.50. However, 
through the efforts of Claimant's counsel, and with the agreement of Oasis, that sum was 
reduced to $7,461.00. 
9. On learning of the existence of the purchase agreement, and in view of the direct 
payment to Oasis from counsel's client trust account in the amount of $7,461.00 from the 
proceeds of the lump sum settlement, the Commission filed its timely notice of reconsideration 
of the lump sum settlement agreement pursuant to the provisions of I.C. § 72-718. Under that 
section, the Commission is empowered to reconsider its decision to approve the lump sum 
settlement agreement on its own initiative. Reconsideration of the approval of the settlement 
was thought necessary because of concerns over the legillity of the payment to Oasis under the 
provisions of I.C. § 72-802. 
10. Following notice to the parties, the Commission held a hearing in Idaho Falls on 
November 30,2010, for the purpose of obtaining additional information concerning the nature of 
Claimant's agreement with Oasis, Mr. Wetzel's involvement in the transaction, and the manner 
of the disbursement of funds. A copy of the transcript of those proceedings has been offered into 
evidence as Oasis Exhibit 2. 
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11. Many of the Commission's concerns over the legality of the $7,461.00 payment 
could not be adequately addressed by the parties in attendance at the November 30, 2010 
hearing. In furtherance of its duties to administer the Idaho Workers' Compensation laws, and 
pursuant to I.C. § 72-714(3), the Commission is empowered to make such inquiries and 
investigations as may be necessary to assure the proper administration of the Workers' 
Compensation laws of this state. The Commission ordered Oasis to appear and show cause why 
the Commission should not enter an order finding that the payment made from counsel's client 
trust account in satisfaction of the June 16, 2009 purchase agreement is illegal under the 
Workers' Compensation laws of this state, and further requiring Oasis to return the sum of 
$7,461.00 to Claimant. 
Tylinski v. Guerdon Enterprises 
12. On or about August 10,2007, Bret Tylinski suffered an accident/injury arising out 
of and in the course of his employment. The claim was accepted by the Workers' Compensation 
Surety, and benefits were paid to Tylinksi, or on his behalf. 
13. As did Gould, Tylinksi sold the right to a portion of the proceeds of his workers' 
compensation settlement to Oasis. Tylinki's case, however, involves two purchase agreements. 
The first agreement was made on or about December 20, 2008, pursuant to the terms of which 
Tylinksi agreed to sell his interest in a portion of the proceeds of any subsequent recovery on his 
workers' compensation claim to Oasis for the sum of $1 ,050.00. The Oasis ownership amounts 
and the payment schedule differed from the payment schedule at issue in Gould, because of the 
lower purchase price. In connection with the December 20, 2008 purchase agreement, the 
following payment schedule applies: 
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Oasis Ownership Amount 
Payment Schedule 
December 19, 2008 to June 18,2009 
June 19,2009 to December 18, 2009 
December 19,2009 to March 18,2010 
March 19,2010 to June 18,2010 
June 19,2010 to December 18, 2010 
December 19,2010 to June 18,2011 
June 19,2011 and thereafter 
Oasis Ex. 3, p 36. 








14. On or about January 5, 2009, Tylinksi entered into a second purchase agreement 
with Oasis, under the terms of which Claimant received $550.00 consideration from Oasis in 
exchange for Oasis' purchase of an interest in the proceeds of any subsequent workers' 
compensation settlement. The payment schedule for the Oasis ownership amount for this 
purchase is set forth in the agreement as follows: 
Oasis Ownership Amount 
PaYment Schedule 
December 31, 2008 to June 29, 2009 
June 30, 2009 to December 30,2009 
December 31,2009 to March 30,2010 
March 31,2010 to June 29, 2010 
June 30, 2010 to December 30,2010 
December 31,2010 to June 29,2011 
June 30, 2011 and thereafter 
Oasis Ex. 6, p. 46. 








15. The purchase agreements at issue in the Tylinski matter are substantially similar 
to the agreement at issue in Gould. However, the Gould agreement contains the following 
provision: 
No Assignment. The parties agree and affirm that this contract does not represent 
an assignment of workers compensation benefits as defined under state law. 
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See, § 6.6, Oasis Ex. 8, p. 59. 
The Tylinski agreements are bereft of this "no assignment" language. 
16. As did Gould, Tylinski and his attorney executed two irrevocable letters of 
direction. 
17. On or about November 5, 2010, Tylinski submitted a proposed lump sum 
settlement agreement for review and approval by the Industrial Commission, under the terms of 
which Tylinski would receive $18,000.00 in settlement of his claims. After deduction of 
attorney's fees and costs of suit, Claimant was expected to net $11,226.00. 
18. Although not disclosed in the lump sum settlement agreement, the Memorandum 
of Attorney's Fees and Costs submitted by Claimant's counsel reveals that counsel expected to 
pay, from the proceeds of the lump sum settlement, the sum of $4,945.00 to Oasis. On or about 
December 9, 2010, the Commission entered its order approving the lump sum settlement in part, 
but requiring Claimant's counsel to retain the sum of $5,220.00 from the proceeds of the 
settlement, representing the amount that would be payable to Oasis ifpaid subsequent to January 
6, 2011, but prior to June 19, 2011. Counsel was ordered to hold this sum in trust, pending 
further order from the Commission on the validity ofthe contract between Tylinski and Oasis. 
Terry Denny v. URS 
19. At all times relevant hereto, Terry Denny was employed by DRS. On June 29 or 
June 30, 2009, Denny suffered an accident/injury arising out of and in the course of his 
employment with Employer. The claim was accepted by Employer/Surety, and workers' 
compensation benefits were paid to Denny or on his behalf. 
20. On or about September 9, 2010, Denny entered into a purchase agreement with 
Oasis, under the terms of which he was paid the sum of $5,150.00 in consideration of Oasis' 
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receipt of an interest in the proceeds of any future recovery made by Denny in connection with 
his worker's compensation claim. The purchase agreement specifies the following payment 
schedule of the Oasis ownership amount: 
Oasis Ownership Amount 
Payment Schedule 
September 9,2010 to March 8,2011 
March 9, 2011 to September 8, 2011 
September 9,2011 to December 8,2011 
December 9, 2011 to March 8, 2012 
March 9, 2012 to September 8,2012 
September 9, 2012 to March 8, 2013 
March 9, 2013 and thereafter 








Fees Due at Payment 
Case Servicing Fee every 6 months 
Subsequent Case Review for each additional funding 




21. The terms of the Denny purchase agreement are substantially similar to those at 
issue in both the Gould and TyIinski transactions. However, the Denny "no assignment" 
language differs slightly from the language used in the Gould contract. In this regard, the Denny 
agreement specifies: 
No Assignment of Workers Compensation Benefits. The Parties agree and 
affirm that this contract does not represent an assignment as defined under state 
law. 
§ 5.8, Denny Purchase Agreement. 
22. On or about April 8, 2011, Denny and Employer/Surety presented a proposed 
lump sum settlement to the Commission for review and approval, under the terms of which 
Claimant would receive $20,000.00 new money. The explanatory attorney fee letter submitted 
by Fred Lewis, Claimant's counsel, reflects that as of April 18, 2011, the Oasis ownership 
amount was approximately $7,800.00. By Order filed April 25, 2011, the Industrial Commission 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 11 
approved the proposed lump sum settlement agreement, except that the Commission ordered 
counsel to hold the sum of $7,724.25, representing the Oasis ownership amount, in trust, pending 
the Commission's determination of the validity of the purchase agreement between Denny and 
Oasis. 
23. Following the issuance of the Industrial Commission's January 26,2011 Order to 
Show Cause in the Gould matter, the Commission entered its May 18, 2011 Order consolidating 
the Tylinski, Gould and Denny matters for purposes of the Order to Show Cause hearing. 
24. Preparatory to hearing, the hearing testimony of James Arnold was taken by way 
of prehearing deposition. 
25. James Arnold is an attorney practicing in eastern Idaho. His practice involves 
primarily the representation of injured workers before the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
26. He testified that approximately five years ago he became aware of the existence 
of Oasis, and other legal financing companies whose business model involved the "loan of 
monies to injured workers against the anticipated recovery in a personal injury or workers' 
compensation action." He testified that he was initially very leery of these companies since the 
money "loaned" to the injured worker was very expensive. However, he testified that as his 
experience with Oasis increased, he found the company easy to work with, and willing to 
negotiate what the company would accept in satisfaction of the Oasis ownership amount. Mr. 
Arnold testified that because of the expensive nature of the Oasis money, he attempts to persuade 
clients to utilize Oasis' services only as a last resort, i.e. after his clients have exhausted more 
conventional, and cheaper, loan opportunities. 
27. Mr. Arnold testified that he has no business relationship with Oasis, and that he 
has n~ver receiv~d a client referral from Oasis. 
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28. Mr. Arnold testified that Oasis does vet the cases of injured workers who offer to 
sell an interest in the proceeds of their workers' compensation claim to Oasis. He testified that 
Oasis is ordinarily reluctant to provide money in cases where liability is disputed. However, he 
noted that in the cases where this has become an issue, he has persuaded Oasis to complete the 
transaction because of his representations about the strength of a particular case. He stated that 
as he developed a relationship with Oasis, the vetting of cases with Oasis became easier as the 
company developed confidence in Mr. Arnold's ability to evaluate cases. 
29. Finally, Mr. Arnold testified that in spite of the expensive nature of the Oasis 
money, the company fills a real need in the Idaho Workers' Compensation system. Where 
$3,000 or $5,000 means the difference between being evicted from one's apartment, or missing a 
mortgage payment, during the pendency of a workers' compensation claim, it is worth obtaining 
money from Oasis, when all other resources have been exhausted. 
30. Lisa Foreman is General Counsel for Oasis. She is licensed to practice law in the 
state ofIIIinois, and has been employed by Oasis since September 2005. Her job responsibilities 
include oversight of litigation in which the company is involved. As well, she assists with the 
company's regulatory initiatives nationwide. She testified that the business model utilized to 
purchase interests in the proceeds of workers' compensation claims is used in 45 states inclusive 
of Idaho. In five states, Oasis has either chosen not to do business, or is prohibited from 
foHowing this business model by applicable law. 
31. Ms. Foreman testified that the Oasis purchase agreement was drafted so as not to 
conflict with non-assignment statutes similar to I.C. § 72-802. Specifically, she testified that 
although the purchase agreement may involve an "assignment," the assignment anticipated by 
the agreement is not the prohibited assignment of a workers' compensation "claim." Rather, per 
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Ms. Foreman, the purchase agreement anticipates the assignment of a contingent interest in the 
proceeds of a workers' compensation settlement. If the purchase agreement was intended to 
effectuate the assignment of the injured worker's claim, then one would expect Oasis to be the 
only entity which could prosecute the claim following the assignment. Clearly, the purchase 
agreement does not anticipate that anyone but claimant can prosecute the claim. The only 
assignment which Ms. Foreman would concede might be anticipated by the language of the 
purchase agreement is the assignment of a contingent interest in the proceeds of the workers' 
compensation settlement. Per Oasis, when it comes to applying the language of I.C. § 72-802, 
there is a real and significant difference between the assignment of a workers' compensation 
claim, and the assignment of the proceeds of a workers' compensation claim. The former is 
prohibited, the latter is not. 
32. Although the purchase agreement bears some similarities to a loan transaction, 
. neither would Ms. Foreman concede that the agreement should be treated as a loan. In the main, 
her argument is that a true loan creates an obligation for the repayment of a debt certain, whereas 
the Oasis purchase agreement creates an obligation only upon the occurrence of certain 
contingencies, including, inter alia, claimant's receipt of an award or settlement of some type 
following the prosecution or settlement of his claim 
33. For the same reason, Ms. Foreman argued that neither does the Oasis purchase 
agreement create a creditor/debtor relationship. Importantly, however, Ms. Foreman 
acknowledged that at some point in the course of an Oasis transaction with an injured worker, 
the relationship might mature into one of a creditor and a debtor. If a settlement is obtained, and 
if there is money remaining in the attorney's client trust account following the payment of 
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medical biils and attorney's fees, then Oasis may become a creditor with respect to the proceeds 
of settlement owed to Oasis per the purchase agreement. (See, Hr. Tr., 16118-18114). 
34. Confirming Mr. Arnold's testimony, Ms. Foreman acknowledged that the Oasis 
money is "expensive," but that Oasis purchase agreements fill a need that goes largely unfilled 
among a sizeable minority of the popUlation of workers' compensation claimants; without Oasis 
type purchase agreements, such claimants would be unable to bridge the financial abyss that lies 
between the curtailment of workers' compensation benefits and the resolution of the workers' 
compensation claim. Ms. Foreman explained that Oasis is not as draconian as might be 
suggested by the repayment schedules described above. Oasis frequently agrees to a reduction of 
the repayment amount depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 
35. During the pendency of the Commission's consideration of this matter, Oasis has 
agreed to freeze the payment schedule for each of the three cases at issue in this proceeding. 
ISSUES 
The following matters are at issue: 
1. Whether there is an actual controversy which warrants the Commission's review 
of the application ofI.C. § 72-802 to the Oasis contracts; 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to consider the legality of the 
Oasis purchase agreements under I.C. § 72-802; 
3. Whether the Oasis purchase agreements violated the provision of I.C. § 72-802: 
a. Whether the Oasis purchase agreement is a prohibited assignment of a 
workers' compensation claim; 
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b. Whether Oasis is a "creditor," and if so, whether the settlement amounts 
paid following the approval of the lump sum settlement agreements at issue 
constitute "compensation" not subject to the claim of a creditor. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
I. 
1. As Oasis has noted, the record is bereft of evidence that any of the Claimants in 
this consolidated proceeding take the position that Oasis is not entitled to recover the Oasis 
ownership amount following the settlement of their respective workers' compensation claims. 
Indeed, although it was Mr. Gould's inquiry concerning the propriety of the payment of the 
Oasis ownership amount from his attorney's client trust account that alerted the Commission to 
these practices and initiated the instant inquiry, Mr. Gould testified that although he and his 
attorney considered whether to dispute the Oasis claim to a portion of the proceeds of settlement, 
he ultimately decided that the indebtedness he had voluntarily incurred should be paid. Mr. 
Gould testified that even if the settlement proceeds in question had been paid directly to him, and 
contrary to the irrevocable letter of direction, he would nevertheless pay Oasis what he owed. 
Although it can be supposed that one or more of the Claimants in these matters might find a use 
for the monies that are in dispute, none of the Claimants have voiced opposition to the 
agreements they executed. However, we do not feel that in the absence of a challenge to the 
provisions of the purchase agreement by one or more of the Claimants, we are prohibited from 
considering whether or not the Oasis purchase agreements are invalid under I.C. § 72-802. 
2. First, these matters arise under the statutory responsibilities created by I.C. § 72-
404. In full, that section provides: 
Lump sum payments. Whenever the commission detennines that it is for the best 
interest of all parties, the liability of the employer for compensation may, on 
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application to the commission by any party interested, be discharged in whole or 
in part by the payment of one or more lump sums to be determined, with the 
approval of the commission. 
3. Therefore, it matters not that the parties have provisionally settled their disputes 
unless the Commission, too, can be satisfied that the settlements are in the best interest of the 
parties. The fact that none of the Claimants in these proceedings have seen fit to challenge the 
propriety of the Oasis purchase agreements informs, but does not govern, the Commission's 
inquiry into whether or not these settlements are in the best interest of the parties. Indeed, were 
we to adopt Oasis' reasoning, the Commission would never be able to consider whether or not a 
proposed settlement is in the best interest of the parties since the parties, having provisionally 
settled their disputes, can no longer be said to have matters in controversy. 
4. In summary, I.C. § 72-404 vests the Commission with the responsibility to 
ascertain whether the proposed lump sum settlements are in the best interest of the parties. Part 
and parcel of that determination is the Commission's assessment of whether or not the provisions 
of I.C. § 72-802 bar Oasis from access to the proceeds of settlement. In each of the three cases 
referenced above, the Commission still has before it for consideration whether the lump sum 
settlement agreement should be approved. Therefore, notwithstanding that the parties are in 
apparent agreement concerning the disposition of the proceeds of settlement, the Commission's 
inquiries concerning the proposed settlement are not only appropriate, but required. 
II. 
5. Oasis also challenges the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction to review the 
propriety of the purchase agreements between Oasis and the Claimants, and each of them. Under 
I.C. § 72-707, the Commission has jurisdiction to consider all questions arising under the 
Workers' Compensation laws of this state. See, Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 2011 Idaho 
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1261 260 P.3d 1186 (2011); Van Tine v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 126 Idaho 688, 889 P.2d 
717 (1994); Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 106 P.3d 455 (2005). Per 
I.C. § 72-404, the Commission has the responsibility to approve lump sum settlement agreements 
and, in so doing, must determine that the settlement is in the best interest of the parties. It 
necessarily follows that the Commission has jurisdiction to clarify claimant's rights under the 
lump sum settlement agreement that is presented to the Commission for approval. See, Williams 
V. Blue Cross of Idaho, supra. It is also worth noting that the statutory provision which may 
invalidate the Oasis purchase agreement is a statute specific to the Workers' Compensation laws, 
and the Commission clearly has jurisdiction to consider whether one of the provisions of the 
statutory scheme it administers affects Oasis' claim to the proceeds of a workers' compensation 
settlement. 
6. For these reasons, the Commission rejects Oasis' assertion that it does not have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. The questions before the Commission are 
clearly questions arising under the Workers' Compensation laws of this state. 
ID. 
I.C. § 72-802 provides: 
Compensation not assignable -- Exempt from execution. No claims for compensation 
under this law, including compensation payable to a resident of this state under the 
worker's compensation laws of any other state, shall be assignable, and all compensation 
and claims therefor shall be exempt from aU claims of creditors, except the restrictions 
under this section shall not apply to enforcement of an order of any court for the support 
of any person by execution, garnishment or wage withholding under chapter 12, title 7, 
Idaho Code. 
7. This statute, and similar provisions found under the laws of other states, appears, 
at first blush, to bar two types of actions. First, the statute prohibits the assignment of claims. 
S~cond, tile statute prohibits the claims of creditors against compensation and claims therefor. 
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With respect to the statutory prohibition against the assignment of claims, Oasis acknowledges 
that an assignment took place. However, it argues that the assignment was not a prohibited 
assignment of a claim. Rather, the assignment made by each ofthe three Claimants to Oasis is of 
a non-prohibited type; the assignment made by the Claimants was of a contingent right to the 
proceeds of a workers' compensation settlement. Oasis argues that had the Idaho legislature 
intended to prohibit this type of assignment, the statute would have so stated. In other words, the 
legislature would have prohibited not only the assignment of "claims for compensation," but also 
the assignment of "compensation." This argument, according to Oasis, finds its best support in 
the fact that the prohibition applicable to creditors applies not only to "claims for compensation," 
but to "compensation" as well. The argument is that the legislature clearly appreciated a 
distinction between compensation and claims therefor in connection with the prohibition against 
the claims of creditors, and it must therefore be presumed that it understood the significance of 
prohibiting the assignment of only "claims for compensation," instead of "claims for 
compensation" and "compensation." This argument has found good traction in several 
jurisdictions. 
8. In Kentucky Employers' Mutual Insurance v. Novation Capital, LLC, 2011 W.L. 
832316 (Ky. Ct. App. February 25, 2011) claimant entered into a settlement of his workers' 
compensation case under the terms of which he would receive $400 per week for 70 weeks, one 
lump sum payment of $150,000 and $486 for 520 weeks. Thereafter, claimant entered into an 
agreement with Novation Capital, pursuant to the terms of which claimant assigned his right to 
the proceeds of his structured settlement in exchange for a lump sum of$112,952. 
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The workers' compensation surety objected to the agreement, arguing that it violated the 
anti-assignment provisions of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation laws, which provided in 
pertinent part: 
[nJo claim for compensation under this chapter shall be assignable, except court 
or administratively ordered child support pursuant to KRS 403.212. All 
compensation and claims therefor, except child support obligations, shall be 
exempt from all claims of creditors. 
Noting,the general rule that courts are required to construe words and phrases according to their 
usual, ordinary and every day meaning, the court rejected the surety's challenge, reasoning that 
by its express language the statute only prohibited the assignment of "claims," not the 
assignment of "compensation." Supporting this conclusion was the court's analysis of the 
broader language prohibiting the claims of creditors. In this regard, the court stated: 
Significantly, the second sentence of the statute distinguishes claims and 
compensation. As pointed out by the circuit court in its thoughtful analysis, had 
the General Assembly intended to prohibit the assignment of an award or 
settlement, it could have simply included language expressing such intent. Based 
on similar facts, the Kentucky Supreme Court reached the same result. 
In Newberg, the injured employee and his employer entered into a settlement 
agreement that provided for reimbursement by the Special Fund for amounts 
determined to be the responsibility of the Fund but paid by the employer pursuant 
to the terms of the agreement. 
9. In Rapid Settlements LTD's Application for Approval of Structured Settlement 
Payment Rights v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company, 133 Wash. Ct. App. 350, 136 
P.3d 765 (2006), North Carolina resident Hargette was the beneficiary of a structured settlement 
in a North Carolina workers' compensation case. To fund the settlement payments, 
employer/surety purchased an annuity from Symetra Life Insurance Company. The settlement 
agreement and the annuity contract prohibited Hargette from assigning his right to payment. 
Time passed, and at so.rp.e point, Hargette arranged to give up his right to some of his future 
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periodic payments to Rapid Settlements LTD, in exchange for a lump sum payment. As required 
by Washington law, Rapid notified Symetra and sought court approval over Symetra's objection. 
In addition to arguing that the annuity contract itself prohibited the assignment of the 
right to periodic payments, Symetra argued that applicable North Carolina Workers' 
Compensation law also prohibited the assignment by Hargette of his right to receive periodic 
payments under the annuity contract. In particular, North Carolina law provided: 
No claim for compensation under this Article shall be assignable, and all 
compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and 
from taxes. 
To this argument, Rapid responded that by its specific language, the North Carolina Act 
bars assignment only of "claims for compensation," not the right to payments achieved by the 
settlement of such claims. 
10. The Washington court ruled that the phrase "all compensation and claims 
therefor" clearly expressed an intention on the part of the North Carolina legislature to 
distinguish between claims for compensation and compensation itself. Had North Carolina 
intended to bar assignment of compensation itself, the statute would have been worded 
differently. For example, North Carolina could have stated the statutory prohibition against 
assignments as follows, had it wished to prohibit both the assignment of claims and 
compensation therefor: 
No compensation and no claims for compensation under this article shall be 
assignable, and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from all 
claims of creditors and from taxes. 
11. The statutory language at issue in both cases discussed above is similar, but not 
identical, to the Idaho statutory scheme. In connection with the issue currently before the 
Industrial Commission, the language of the statute prohibiting the assignment of claims bears 
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closer examination. Following the 2009 amendment to I.C. § 72-802, the section of the statute 
dealing with the prohibited assignments reads as follows: 
Compensation not assignable - exempt from execution. No claims for 
compensation under this law, including compensation payable to a resident of this 
state under the workers' compensation laws of any other state shall be assignable 
12. It is immediately apparent that the non-assignment provisions of LC. § 72-802, 
though similar to the statutes at issue in the Kentucky and Washington cases discussed above, 
contains some significant differences. Against the suggestion that Idaho, too, is among those 
jurisdictions which distinguish between the assignment of claims and the assignment of 
compensation, there are two components of the statutory language which suggest otherwise. 
First, the title of the statute plainly states that "compensation [is] not assignable." Anticipating 
the need to reconcile this language with the interpretation it promotes, Oasis argues that the title 
of the statute must be ignored where it conflicts with the unambiguous direction of the body of 
the statute. In other words, Oasis argues that the title of the statute cannot be used to create an 
ambiguity where none otherwise exists. Cited in support of this proposition are Kelso and Irwin, 
PA. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000); and State v. Peterson, 141 
Idaho 473, 111 P.3d 158 (2004). In Peterson, the court ruled that although the title is a part of 
the statute, it may not be used as a means of creating an ambiguity when the body of the act itself 
is clear. We believe that Oasis has correctly apprehended Idaho's adoption ofthis general rule of 
statutory construction. However, as developed below, we also believe that the body of the 
statute is not without ambiguity, thus making it appropriate to consider the title of the statute, 
along with the language of the statute, itself, to infer the legislature'S intentions. 
13. As noted, the statute ostensibly prohibits only the assignment of claims, while 
protecting both claims and compensation from the claims of creditors. However, it is important 
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to recognize that in the section of the statute prohibiting the assignment of claims, the 2009 
amendment to the statute specifies that this prohibition against the assignment of claims includes 
"compensation payable" to an Idaho resident under the workers' compensation laws of another 
state. Had it been the intent of the legislature to narrowly define the word "claim" to mean only 
the assignment of claimant's chose in action, not to include the proceeds payable as a 
consequence of the successful prosecution of that claim, then the amendment would have been 
stated differently, or incorporated elsewhere in the statute. To be consistent with the 
construction urged upon the Commission by Oasis, the statute could have been written as 
follows: 
No claims for compensation under this law, including claims for compensation 
payable to a resident of this state under the workers' compensation laws of any 
other state . . . 
As well, to give effect to the construction urged by Oasis, the 2009 amendment could have been 
inserted at a different place in the statute: 
No claims for compensation under this law shall be assignable, and all 
compensation and claims therefor, including compensation payable to a resident 
of this state under the workers' compensation laws of any other state, shall be 
exempt from all claims of creditors ... 
14. Instead, the amendment makes it clear that "claims," which term includes 
compensation payable to an Idaho claimant under the workers' compensation laws of some other 
state, are not assignable. This structure strongly suggests that the legislature's use of the term 
"claim" was intended to include not only a prohibition against the assignment of the cause of 
action, but also a prohibition against the assignment of the proceeds payable to an injured worker 
as the result of his or her workers' compensation claim. 
15. To the extent that the non-assignment language of the statute is deemed 
ambiguous, we think that the title of the statute, which is not utilized in this context to create an 
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ambiguity, actually lends further support to the proposition that what the legislature intended was 
to prohibit both the assignment of claims, and proceeds thereof. 
16. This reading ofI.C. § 72-802 finds support in the recent case of Williams v. Blue 
Cross of Idaho, supra. Discussing in the legislature's purpose in adopting I.C. § 72-802, the 
court observed: 
The purpose behind exempting workers' compensation proceeds from the claims of 
creditors is not to allow the injured worker to recover twice for his or her medical 
expenses but, rather, to protect the worker and his or her family from the financial 
difficulties associated with the worker's injury. 
"Workers' compensation awards are intended not to make the worker 
rich, but to keep an injured worker and the worker's family from 
becoming destitute because the breadwinner has been injured and 
cannot work. In order to protect this award and further this policy, 
workers' compensation statutes typically provide that these awards 
cannot be attached by creditors. Moreover, they provide that the 
worker cannot voluntarily assign the proceeds, primarily in order to 
ensure that injured workers who may have a valid claim but have not 
yet received the first payments and are desperate for cash do not sell 
their rights at fire sale prices." Validity, construction, and effect of 
statutory exemptions of proceeds of workers' compensation awards, 
48 A.L.R.5th 473 (1997). 
Williams v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 260 P.3d at 1193. 
17. The Court paraphrased the I.C. § 72-802 prohibitions as follows: 
The plain language of I.C. § 72-802 prohibits (1) a workers' compensation 
claimant from assigning workers' compensation proceeds to a third party, and (2) 
a creditor, other than one seeking to recover child support, from asserting a claim 
against workers' compensation proceeds paid to a claimant. 
Although the Court was well aware of the specific language used by the legislature in crafting 
the provisions of the statute, it nevertheless concluded that the prohibition against assignment 
extends to the assignment of workers' compensation proceeds, exactly what has been attempted 
in these cases under the Oasis purchase agreement. We also think it important that the Williams 
Court made a point of emphasizing that I.C. § 72-802 is intended to protect the injured worker 
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against exactly the type of practice that is at issue in this matter. By its citation to the ALR 5th 
Article quoted above, the Court has recognized that one of the purposes of I.C. § 72-802 is to 
ensure that injured workers with valid, yet unrecognized, claims, will not sell their rights at "fire 
sale prices" in order to keep body and soul together during the pendency of their claim. The 
Court's explanation of the legislative purpose underline I.C. § 72-802 precisely anticipates the 
facts of these cases. 
18. The assignment at issue was an assignment of an expectancy, or a contingent right 
to receive workers' compensation benefits. Certainly, at the time of the assignment, these were 
rights that had not yet ripened to a certainty. However, the assignment of a conditional right to 
something is well recognized under Idaho law. See, Simplot v. Western Heritage Insurance 
Company, 132 Idaho 582, 977 P.2d 196 (1999); Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 848, 252 P.3d 
1266 (2011); Capps v. FIA Card Services, 149 Idaho 737, 240 P.3d 583 (2010). We see nothing 
in the facts of this case that makes the Oasis purchase of a contingent right to the proceeds of a 
workers' compensation claim anything less than an "assignment" of an expectancy, under Idaho 
law. 
19. Weare not unmindful of the fact that the prosecution of a contested workers' 
compensation claim is a sometimes protracted affair. We are aware of the fact that it is not 
unusual for a typical workers' compensation claimant to be deemed a poor credit risk, unable to 
access any of the more traditional, and cheaper, forms of credit available in the community. We 
recognize that whatever else might be said about the cost associated with obtaining money from 
a legal financing company such as Oasis, these companies fill a need as lenders oflast resort who 
can provide an injured worker with the means to obtain what is absolutely necessary to keep a 
roof over his head, or put food on the table, until he recognizes something from his workers' 
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compensation claim. We are loathe to deny the injured workers of this state this last choice, 
especially when we have nothing to offer Claimant during the pendency of a litigated claim. 
However, we believe that the Oasis business model, notwithstanding that it is styled as a 
purchase/sale, nevertheless relies upon an assignment of a contingent right to workers' 
compensation benefits. We find, therefore, that these assignments are invalid under LC. § 72-
802. 
20. Because we have found that a prohibited assignment of Claimants' rights to 
workers' compensation benefits took place, we do not reach the question of whether or not Oasis 
is also a creditor who is prohibited from making a claim against compensation, or claims 
therefor. 
21. Although we have found that the Oasis agreements rely upon a prohibited 
assignment, we also recognize that our ruling has the potential to create a windfall to Gould, 
Tylinksi and Denny. To prevent unjust enrichment to these Claimants, we believe that where a 
Claimant's recovery in an underlying workers' compensation case is otherwise sufficient to 
implicate the requirement to pay the Oasis ownership amount, the equitable solution is to require 
the injured worker to reimburse Oasis in the amount of the purchase price originally paid by 
Oasis to the injured worker at the outset ofthe relationship. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. The purchase agreement and associated documents executed by Tylinski, Gould 
and Denny create assignments of an expectancy in the proceeds of their workers' compensation 
claims, which is prohibited under the provisions ofLC. § 72-802; 
However, to prevent unjust enrichment to Tylinksi, Gould and Denny, and to return the 
parties, as ne~rly ~$ possible, to the posHions they were in prior to the prohibited assignments, 
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Tylinksi, Gould and Denny shall each reimburse Oasis in the amount of the purchase price paid 
by Oasis under the terms of the purchase agreements at issue; 
2. On the Commission's Notice of Reconsideration of the lump sum settlement at 
issue in Gould v. Ormond Builders, Oasis is directed to repay to Claimant the sum of $3,811.00, 
representing the difference between the negotiated settlement of the Oasis ownership amount 
($7,461.00) and the purchase price originally paid by Oasis ($3,650.00). The subject lump sum 
settlement agreement is, in all other respects, approved, per the Commission's Order of 
September 2, 2010; 
3. In the matter of Tylinski v. Guerdon Enterprises, LLC, and pursuant to the 
December 9, 2010 Order approving, in part, the lump sum agreement, counsel for Claimant is 
hereby ordered to release to Claimant the sum of $3,620, representing the difference between the 
amount retained by Counsel in his client trust account at the direction of the Commission 
($5,220.00) and the purchase price paid by Oasis, ($1,600.00). Counsel is directed to release to 
Oasis the sum of$I,600.00; 
4. In the matter of Denny v. URS, and pursuant to the Commission's Order 
approving, in part, Stipulation and Agreement for Lump Sum Settlement filed April 25, 2011, 
counsel for Claimant is hereby directed to release to Claimant the sum of $2,574.25, representing 
the difference between the amount retained by Counsel in his client trust account at the direction 
of the Commission ($7,724.25) and the purchase price paid by Oasis ($5,150.00). Counsel is 
directed to release the sum of$5,150.00 to Oasis. 
5. This order is final and conclusive as to all matters decided herein pursuant to I.C. 
§ 72-718. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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DATED this _13th_ day of_January ______ , 2012. 
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CO:&REGIDOR 
CORREGIDOR. In Spanish law. A . magistrate 
Who took cognizance of . various ' misdemeanors, 
and of civil matters. 2 White, New Recop. 53. 
CORREI. Lat. In the civil law . . Co-stipulators; 
joint stipulators. . 
· COR.REI CREDENDi. . In the civil ' and Scotch 
law. Joint. creditors; creditors in solido . . Path. 
ObI. pt. 2, c. 4, art. 3, .§ 11. . ' 
CORREI DE:BENDI.In Scotch law. Two or more 
persons bound a~ principal debtors to another. 
. Ersk.Inst. 3! 3, 74. . 
CORRELATIVE. Having a mutual or reciprocal 
relation, in such sense tha t the existence of one 
necessarily implies the existence of 'the other. 
Father . and son; are correlative terms. Claim 
and duty are correlative terms . . 
CORRESPONDENCE. Interchange of written 
· communications . . The letters' written 'by a person. 
· and the answers written by the one to whom they 
are addressed. . 
CORROBORATE . . ' Tostrengthen;tQ add weight 
.or credibility to a · thing by additional and con· 
firming .facts or evidence. Lassiteo v. Seaboard 
Air Line Ry. Co., 171 N .C. 283, 88 S.E. 335,337; 
Bradley v. State, 19 Ala.App. 578, 99 So. 321, 322; 
Holines 'v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 423, · 157 S;W. 487, 
'493; State v. Fullerton Lumber Co.; 35 S.D. 410, 
152 N.W, 708, 715; Kincaid v: State, 131 Tex.Cr. 
· R 101, 97 S.W.2d175, 177. . 
. The '. expression "corroboratlng . cIrcumstances" . clearly 
does not mean facts which, Independent of a confession, 
will, Warrant a' convictIon; for then · the verdict would 
stand .·not on the confessIon, .but upon ·those Independent 
· Circumstances. To' corroborate Is to strengthen, to corillrm-
.. by ·additlonal security; to add .strength. .The testimony of 
a witness Is sald to be corroborated when !tIs shown to . 
.correspond ·wlth the representatIon of some' other wItness, 
or to compor:t wIth some facts otherwIse known or estab-
llsheu. Corroborating circumstances, then, used In refer-
enceto a confessIon. are such as serve to .strengthen It, to 
render It more p~obable; such; In short, as may serv.e to 
, impress a . jury . wIth a belle! In Its truth_ State v. Gulld 
10 N.J.Law, 163, 1~ AID.Dec. 404. ' . , 
· CO~ROBOR~TINGEvmENCE. . Evidence su~ 
plementary .· to . that already given and tending to 
strengthen or confirm. it; · additional evidence of 
a. different character to the same' point. In re 
· .Cardoner's Estate, 27 N.M. 105,196 P. 327, 328; 
.Statev. Smith, 75 Mont. 22,241 P. 522, 523 ; Pepple 
.v. Follette, 74 Cal.A.pp, 178, 240 P; 502, 519; Rad· · 
· cliffe v.Chavez, 15 N.M. 258, 110 p, 699,701. 
CORR.OBORATIVE EVIDENCE. See .Corroborat· 
ing Evlden~e. . 
CORRUPT. Spoifed;tainted; vitiated; de· 
prayed; debased. Webster. 
· CORRUPT INTENT. :A-, ;'~oi-~Pt .intent," as an 
2d423, 425, which only requires intent t6.. receIve 
more than the law pennits for . forbearanceiJ! 
money, but does not require that ·taker knows, that . 
he is violating usury law. . ' "::. , 
'. "'), 
CORRUP:r' PRACTICES ACT. The Act .of June 
25, .1910, c. 392, 36 Stat. 822, which, like the. Eng~ 
lish act of 1883 and supplements, dealt with '(cor· 
rupt . and illegal practices" in connection with' 
elections, and which was repealed by the . "Federal . 
Corrupt Practices' Act" 'of ·Feb. 28, .1925, c. '368, 
Title III, 2 U.S.C.A. § 241 et seq. 
CORRUPTIO' OPTIMI EST PEssrnA; '. C~rrup . 
tion of the best is worst . . Jacobs v. Beecham; '221 
U.S. 263, 31 S.Ct. 555, 55 L.Ed. 729. 
CORRuPTION. IilegalitY; a vicious and fraudil· 
lent intention to evade the · pr6hibitions of the 
law; something ' against or: forbidden by law; 
moral turpitUde' or . exactly opposite6f honesty 
involving intentional dIsregard of law from 1m· 
proper motives .. State v. Barnett, 60 Okl.Cr .. 355, 
69 P.2d77, 87. ··· . . 
,An act done with' an intent to give :some advan· 
tage inconsistent with offiCial ·duty and.the rights 
of others. Johnson v. U. S.,C.C.A.Alaska, 260 F. . 
783,786. . .. . . .... ~ 
The act ot an. officIal .'or · fiducIary person who unlawfulIy_ 
and wrongfully uses:. his station' or 'character ' to procnre 'V' :.: 
"orne benefit ~or ' himself. or for another person, contrary to 7' 
duty ' and the rIghts of others .. U. S. V. Johnson, C.C;Ga., 
26 F. 682'; Worsham v. Murchison, 66 Ga. 719; U. S. v. . 
Edwards, C,C.Ala., 43 F. 67. ... . ... . 
CORRUPTION OF llLOOD. In English law . 
The consequence of attainder., l;>eing that the 'at· 
tainted person could neither inherit lands or other 
hereditaments from his ancestor, nor retain those 
he already had, nor' transmit· them by descent. to 
any heir,. because his blood was considered in law 
lo:be ·corrupted.Avery v; Everett, 110 N.X.317, 18 
N:E: 148, 1 L.R.~. 264; 1 Steph.Comm. 446. This 
was abolished by St. 3 & 4 Wm . . IV. c. 106, ' arid 
33 & 34 Viet. c. 23, and is unknown in Anierica, 
Const.U.S. art. 3, § 3. .' . 
CORRUPTLY. . When used in . a· statute, this term 
generally ilpports a wrongful ' design to ~ acquire 
some pecuniary or other advantage. ".' Grebe v. 
State, 112 Neb. 715, 201N.W. 143, ' 144; Bosselinan 
v. U. S., C.<;:.A.N.Y.; .239 F. 82, 86; Statev:. Ship· 
man, 202 N.C. 518, 163' $,E.657. '. ' - '. . 
CORSELET; . Ancient armor which ' covered the 
body. 
. CORSE-PRESENT.' In '~ldEng1ish law; "'A mor, 
tuary, thus termed · because; ' when a mortuary 
became due on the death ,of a ,:inan, the' best or 
second-best 'beast was, according to custom, offered 
or presented to the priest, and carried with tlie 
co,·p~e. In . Wales a co~se.~r~se~~ .was due u~~m 
which . the . ; 
· preca#on.. j 
nounced 'im 




the ' parliam 
. CORTEX . . : 
of 'anything: 
CORTIS • .A 
u 
CORTULARIUl\I, or CORTi\RIm 
ords, A yard adjoining a countr: 
CORvEE. .:in Fre~ch law. Gratu 
acted from.the villages orcommun 
for repairing roads, . constructinli 
State v. Covington, 125 N.C. 641, 3-
. CORvEESEIGNEuRIALE. Servi( 
of the manor, Guyot, .Rep.,Univ.; ~ 
COSA JUZGADA. In Spanish la' 
matter adjudged, (res judicata.) 
Recop. b. 3', tit. 8,> note .. 
. . . 
COSASCOMtrNES. In Spanish la' 
r~sporiding . to the ' res communes, 
law, and descriptive oLsuch thin: 
to the equal and com,mon enjoyrr 
sons and not to be reduced to pri, 
such as . the 'air, the sea, ' and the w . 
streams. Hall, Mex.Lawi 447; I 
69. Cal. 255, 10 P. 707. . . 
COSBERING .. See Coshering. 
COSDuNA. In feudal law . . ,A ell! 
COSEN,COZEN. In old English 
"A.cosening knave." 3 Le·on. 171. 
COSENAGE. (Also spelled "Cosi 
age.") . In old. English law. A w 
the' heir where the tresaiZ, i .. ·e., tt 
'besail, or· great-grandfather, was 
in fee at . his death, and a strangE 
. the land apd abated. Fitzh.Nat.B 
·.: Comm. *186. 
Kindred; cousinship; , relatior 
Stat. 4 Hen. m. cap. 8; -3 Bla.C 
Litt. 160a: . 
COSENING. In bId English la, 
mentioned in the old books, wher 
done deceitfully, whether belongi 
or not, which could, not be· prop 
any special name. The same as 
of the civil law, Cowell; West.Syr 
ment, § ,68; . Blount; 4. Bla.COJ;nm. 
Social Security Publications 
S~ocial Security 
The Oftidal Website of the U.S. Social Security Administration 
Disability llenefits 
SSA Publication No. 05-10029, JUDe 2012,ICN 456000 
Disability benefits 
Disability is something most people do not like to think about But the chances that you will become 
disabled probably are greater than you realize. Studies show that a 20-year-old worker has a 3 in 10 
chance of becoming disabled before reaching full retirement age. 
This booklet provides basic Information on Social Security disability benefits and is not intended to answer 
all questions. For specific information about your situation, you should talk with a Social Security 
representative. 
We pay disability benefits through two programs: the Social Security disability Insurance program and the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. This booklet is about the Social Security disability program. 
For Information about the SSI disability program for adults, see Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
(Publication No. 05-11000). For information about disability programs for children, refer to Benefits For 
Children With Disabilities (Publication No. 05-10026). Our publications are available at Get A Publication. 
Who can get Social Security disability benefits? 
Social Security pays benefits to people who cannot work because they have a medical condition that isJ~ 
expected to last at least one year or result In death. Federal law requires this very strict definition of 7r" 
disability. While some programs give money to people with partial disability or short-term disability, Social 
Security does not 
Certain family membens of disabled workens also can receive money from Social Security. This is 
explained in "Can my family get benefits?" 
How Do I Meet The Earnings Requirement For Disability Benefits? 
In general, to get disability benefits, you must meet two different eamings tests: 
1. A 'recent work" test basad on your age at the time you became disabled; and 
2. A "duration of work' test to show that you worked long enough under Social Security. 
Certain blind workers have to meet only the 'duration of work' test 
The table below, shows the rules for how much work you need for the "recent work' test based on your age 
when your disability began. The rules in this table are based on the calendar quarter in which you tumed 
orwlll tum a certain age. 
The calendar quartens are: 
I rst Quarter: January 1 through March 31 
econd Quarter: April 1 through June 30 
hlrd Quarter: July 1 through September 30; and 
ourth Quarter: October 1 through December 31 
Rules for work needed for the "recent work test" 
orne 
Then you generally need: 
disabled ... 
In or before the quarter 1.5 yeans of work during the three-year period ending with the quarter your 
you tum age 24 disability began. 
Work during half the time for the period beginning with the quarter after you 
I n the quarter after you tumed 21 and ending with the quarter you became disabled. Example: If you 
tum age 24 but before the become disabled in the quarter you tumed age 27, then you would need three 
quarter you tum age 31 years of work out of the six-year period ending with the quarter you became 
disabled. 
In the quarter you tum Work during five yeans out of the 10-year period ending with the quarter your 
age 31 or later disability began. 







How to order 
b 
1999 2000 2001 
AVERAGE STATE WAGE (ASW) 456.00 471.00 495.00 
55% ASW (PPI) 250.80 259.05 272.25 
MINIMUM 45% ASW 
(unless over 90% AWW) 205.20 211.95 222.75 
45% INCREASE 5.85 6.75 10.80 
60%ASW 273.60 282.60 297.00 
-Increase from Last Year 7.80 9.00 14.40 
67%ASW 305.52 315.57 331.65 
- Increase from Last Year 8.71 10.05 16.08 
90% ASW MAXIMUM 410.40 423.90 445.50 
-Increase from Last Year 11.70 13.50 21.60 
15% ASW MINIMUM* 68.40 70.65 74.25 
-Increase from Last Year 1.95 2.25 3.60 
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE (AWW) 
.142857 - 1 day .428571-3 days .714285-5 days 
.285714 - 2 dys .571428-4 days .857142~ days 
rn 
Idaho Workers' Compensation Benefits Table 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
526.00 527.00 534.00 543.00 565.00 
289.30 289.85 293.70 298.65 310.75 
236.70 237.15 240.30 244.35 254.25 
13.95 0.45 3.15 4.05 9.90 
315.60 316.20 320.40 325.80 339.00 
18.60 0.60 4.20 5.40 13.20 
352.42 353.09 357.78 363.81 378.55 
20.77 0.67 4.69 6.03 14.74 
473.40 474.30 480.60 488.70 508.50 
27.90 0.90 6.30 8.10 19.80 
78.90 79.05 80.10 81.45 84.75 
4.65 0.15 1.05 1.35 3.30 
----------
To determine weekly wage for monthly salary: 
.23077 x monthly wage = weekly wage 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
584.00 618.00 636.00 643.00 646.00 661.00 
321.20 339.90 349.80 353.65 355.30 363.55 
262.80 278.10 286.20 289.35 290.70 297.45 
8.55 15.30 8.10 3.15 1.35 6.75 
350.40 370.80 381.60 385.80 387.60 396.60 
11.40 20.40 10.80 4.20 1.80 9.00 
391.28 414.06 426.12 430.81 432.82 442.87 
12.73 22.78 12.06 4.69 2.01 10.05 
525.60 556.20 572.40 578.70 581.40 594.90 
17.10 30.60 16.20 6.30 2.70 13.50 
87.60 92.70 95.40 96.45 96.90 99.15 
2.85 5.10 2.70 1.05 0.45 2.25 
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life Tables A period life table is based on the mortality experience of a population during a relatively short period 
oftime. Here we present the 2007 period life table for the Social Security area population. For this 
table, the period life expectancy at a given age represents the average number of years of life 
remaining if a group of persons at that age were to experience the mortality rates for 2007 over the 
course of their remaining life. 
Period Life Table 2007 , 
Male Female 
Exact Death Number of Life Death Number of Life 
age probability • lives b expectancy probability • lives b expectancy 
0 0.007379 100,000 75.38 0.006096 100,000 80.43 
1 0.000494 99,262 74.94 0.000434 99,390 79.92 
2 0.000317 99,213 73.98 0.000256 99,347 78.95 
3 0.000241 99,182 73.00 0.000192 99,322 77.97 
4 0.000200 99,158 72.02 0.000148 99,303 76.99 
5 0.000179 99,138 71.03 0.000136 99,288 76.00 
6 0.000166 99,120 70.04 0.000128 99,275 75.01 
7 0.000152 99,104 69.05 0.000122 99,262 74.02 
8 0.000133 99,089 68.06 0.000115 99,250 73.03 
9 0.000108 99,075 67.07 0.000106 99,238 72.04 
10 0.000089 99,065 66.08 0.000100 99,228 71.04 
11 0.000094 99,056 65.09 0.000102 99,218 70.05 
12 0.000145 99,047 64.09 0.000120 99,208 69.06 
13 0.000252 99,032 63.10 0.000157 99,196 68.07 
14 0.000401 99,007 62.12 0.000209 99,180 67.08 
15 0.000563 98,968 61.14 0.000267 99,160 66.09 
16 0.000719 98,912 60.18 0.000323 99,133 65.11 
17 0.000873 98,841 59.22 0.000369 99,101 64.13 
18 0.001017 98,754 58.27 0.000401 99,064 63.15 
19 0.001148 98,654 57.33 0.000422 99,025 62.18 
20 0.001285 98,541 56.40 0.000441 98,983 61.20 
21 0.001412 98,414 55.47 0.000463 98,939 60.23 
22 0.001493 98,275 54.54 0.000483 98,894 59.26 
23 0.001513 98,128 53.63 0.000499 98,846 58.29 
24 0.001487 97,980 52.71 0.000513 98,796 57.32 
25 0.001446 97,834 51.78 0.000528 98,746 56.35 
26 0.001412 97,693 50.86 0.000544 98,694 55.38 
27 0.001389 97,555 49.93 0.000563 98,640 54.40 
28 0.001388 97,419 49.00 0.000585 98,584 53.44 
29 0.001405 97,284 48.07 0.000612 98,527 52.47 
30 0.001428 97,147 47.13 0.000642 98,466 51.50 
31 0.001453 97,009 46.20 0.000678 98,403 50.53 
32 0.001487 96,868 45.27 0.000721 98,336 49.56 
33 0.001529 96,724 44.33 0.000771 98,266 48.60 
34 0.001584 96,576 43.40 0.000830 98,190 47.64 
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Male Female 
Exact Death Number of Life Death Number of Life 
age probability • lives b expectancy probability • lives b expectancy 
35 0.001651 96,423 42.47 0.000896 98,108 46.68 
36 0.001737 96,264 41.54 0.000971 98,020 45.72 
37 0.001845 96,096 40.61 0.001056 97,925 44.76 
38 0.001979 95,919 39.68 0.001153 97,822 43.81 
39 0.002140 95,729 38.76 0.001260 97,709 42.86 
40 0.002323 95,525 37.84 0.001377 97,586 41.91 
41 0.002526 95,303 36.93 0.001506 97,452 40.97 
42 0.002750 95,062 36.02 0.001650 97,305 40.03 
43 0.002993 94,800 35.12 0.001810 97,144 39.10 
44 0.003257 94,517 34.22 0;001985 96,968 38.17 
45 0.003543 94,209 33.33 0.002174 96,776 37.24 
46 0.003856 93,875 32.45 0.002375 96,566 36.32 
47 0.004208 93,513 31.57 0.002582 96,336 35.41 
48 0.004603 93,120 30.71 0.002794 96,087 34.50 
49 0.005037 92,691 29.84 0.003012 95,819 33.59 
50 0.005512 92,224 28.99 0.003255 95,530 32.69 
51 0.006008 91,716 28.15 0.003517 95,219 31.80 
52 0.006500 91,165 27.32 0.003782 94,885 30.91 
53 0.006977 90,572 26.49 0.004045 94,526 30.02 
54 0.007456 89,940 25.68 0.004318 94,143 29.14 
55 0.007975 89,270 24.87 0.004619 93,737 28.27 
56 0.008551 88,558 24.06 0.004965 93,304 27.40 
57 0.009174 87,800 23.26 0.005366 92,841 26.53 
58 0.009848 86,995 22.48 0.005830 92,342 25.67 
59 0.010584 86,138 21.69 0.006358 91,804 24.82 
60 0.011407 85,227 20.92 0.006961 91,220 23.97 
61 0.012315 84,254 20.16 0.007624 90,585 23.14 
62 0.013289 83,217 19.40 0.008322 89,895 22.31 
63 0.014326 82,111 18.66 0.009046 89,147 21.49 
64 0.015453 80,935 17.92 0.009822 88,340 20.69 
65 0.Q16723 79,684 17.19 0.010698 87,473 19.89 
66 0.018154 78,351 16.48 0.011702 86,537 19.10 
67 0.019732 76,929 15.77 0.012832 85,524 18.32 
68 0.021468 75,411 15.08 0.014103 84,427 17.55 
69 0.023387 73,792 14.40 0.015526 83,236 16.79 
70 0.025579 72,066 13.73 0.017163 81,944 16.05 
71 0.028032 70,223 13.08 0.018987 80,537 15.32 
72 0.030665 68,254 12.44 0.020922 79,008 14.61 
73 0.033467 66,161 11.82 0.022951 77,355 13.91 
74 0.036519 63,947 11.21 0.025147 75,580 13.22 
75 0.040010 61,612 10.62 0.027709 73,679 12.55 
76 0.043987 59,147 10.04 0.030659 71,638 11.90 
77 0.048359 56,545 9.48 0.033861 69,441 11.26 
78 0.053140 53,811 8.94 0.037311 67,090 10.63 
79 0.058434 50,951 8.41 0.041132 64,587 10.03 
80 0.064457 47,974 7.90 0.045561 61,930 9.43 
81 0.071259 44,882 7.41 0.050698 59,109 8.86 
82 0.078741 41,683 6.94 0.056486 56,112 8.31 
RULE 3. 
PLEADINGS 
A. Complaint and Answer. 
1. . For purposes of these rules, an "application for hearing" as referenced in Idaho 
Code § 72-706 shall be called a complaint. The complaint shall be in the form 
prescribed by the Commission, a sample of which is attached hereto as Appendix 
1. A complaint delivered by facsiInile transmission (fax) to the Commission 
before midnight Mountain Time shall be considered filed on that date. 
2. The answer to such complaint shall be in the form prescribed by the Commission, 
a sample of which is attached hereto as Appendix 3. 
B. Separate Complaints. 
1. Consolidation - A separate complaint shall be filed for each alleged accident or 
occupational disease for which workers' compensation benefits are claimed. 
Separate pleadings shall be filed in each case in which a complaint has been filed; 
pr9vided, however,· that a single pleading may be filed in two or more cases which 
have been consolidated. No cases shall be consolidated except by order of the 
Commission, and the Commission will not consider consolidation of cases unless 
a separate complaint has been filed in each and every case sought to be 
consolidated. 
C. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. 
Any claim against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) shall be made by filing a 
separate complaint in accordance with Idaho Code, § 72-334 and shall be in the fonn prescribed 
by the Commission, a sarnple·ofwhich is attached hereto as Appendix 2. All complaints against 
. the ISIF shall be filed with the Commission and a copy slla,ll be served on all other parties. 
D. Certifyin~ Pleadings, Motions or Other Papers. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper. of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one licensed attorney of record of the State of Idaho, in the attorney's 
individual name. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the pleading, motion, 
or otherpaper. The signature of any party to an action, or the party'§ attorney, shall constitute a 
certification that said party, or the party's attorney, has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his or her knowledge, infonnation and belief after reasonable inquiry there are 
sufficient grounds to support it; and that it is not submitted for delay or any other improper 
purpose. 
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E. Motions Generally. 
1. An application to the Commission for an order shall be made by filing a motion . 
which, unless made during a hearing, shall be made in writing, state the legal and 
factual basis for the motion, and set forth the relief or order sought. 
2. If after 14 days from the filing of a motion, no brief, affidavit, or other response is 
filed, the Commission may act on the motion. The Commission may act on the 
motion sooner after giving actUal notice, or attempting to give actual notice by 
telephone or by facsimile transmission, to all parties. If the motion is opposed by 
any party, the Commission may base its ruling on written argument or may 
conduct such . conference or hearing as may be necessary, in the Commission's 
judgment, to rule on the motion. 
3. All motions and other pleadings shall be served on any other party. 
F. Motions to Reconsider. 
A motion to reconsider pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718 shall be made! within 20 days 
from the date the final decision is filed and shall be supported by· a brief filed with the motion. 
All responses toa motion to reconsider shall be filed within 14 days of the date of filing of the 
motion. Any reply brief shall be filed no later than 10 days from the date of filing the response. 
G. Form and Size Requirements for Filed Documents. 
All pleadings, letters, petitions, briefs, notices and other documents filed with the 
Commission shall be on 8 1/2" xII" paper. 
COMMENT: Subse.ctionE •. 2 . .A .re.sponse to a mo.tion now .allows .14 days instead.of 10 to accommodate 
delivery and review .of the material before preparation of a responsive filing. 
COMMENT BE: Complaint - The necessity to sign the release by claimant is not jurisdictional to filing 
the complaint. The use of this form is intended for ease in receiving medical information by 
Employer/Surety. Should claimant refuse to release such medical information, serious consequences may 
develop in continuing the claim for benefits. . 
1 Amended March 1, 2008 
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